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BAYES AND EMPIRICAL-BAYES MULTIPLICITY ADJUSTMENT
IN THE VARIABLE-SELECTION PROBLEM
By James G. Scott1 and James O. Berger
University of Texas at Austin and Duke University
This paper studies the multiplicity-correction effect of standard
Bayesian variable-selection priors in linear regression. Our first goal
is to clarify when, and how, multiplicity correction happens auto-
matically in Bayesian analysis, and to distinguish this correction
from the Bayesian Ockham’s-razor effect. Our second goal is to con-
trast empirical-Bayes and fully Bayesian approaches to variable selec-
tion through examples, theoretical results and simulations. Consider-
able differences between the two approaches are found. In particular,
we prove a theorem that characterizes a surprising aymptotic dis-
crepancy between fully Bayes and empirical Bayes. This discrepancy
arises from a different source than the failure to account for hyper-
parameter uncertainty in the empirical-Bayes estimate. Indeed, even
at the extreme, when the empirical-Bayes estimate converges asymp-
totically to the true variable-inclusion probability, the potential for a
serious difference remains.
1. Introduction. This paper addresses concerns about multiplicity in
the traditional variable-selection problem for linear models. We focus on
Bayesian and empirical-Bayesian approaches to the problem. These methods
both have the attractive feature that they can, if set up correctly, account
for multiplicity automatically, without the need for ad-hoc penalties.
Given the huge number of possible predictors in many of today’s scien-
tific problems, these concerns about multiplicity are becoming ever more
relevant. They are especially critical when researchers have little reason to
suspect one model over another, and simply want the data to flag interest-
ing covariates from a large pool. In such cases, variable selection is treated
less as a formal inferential framework and more as an exploratory tool used
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to generate insights about complex, high-dimensional systems. Still, the re-
sults of such studies are often used to buttress scientific conclusions or guide
policy decisions—conclusions or decisions that may be quite wrong if the
implicit multiple-testing problem is ignored.
Our first objective is to clarify how multiplicity correction enters Bayesian
variable selection: by allowing the choice of prior model probabilities to de-
pend upon the data in an appropriate way. Some useful references on this
idea include Waller and Duncan (1969), Meng and Dempster (1987), Berry
(1988), Westfall, Johnson and Utts (1997), Berry and Hochberg (1999) and
Scott and Berger (2006). We also clarify the difference between multiplicity
correction and the Bayesian Ockham’s-razor effect [see Jefferys and Berger
(1992)], which induces a very different type of penalty on model complex-
ity. This discussion will highlight the fact that not all Bayesian analyses
automatically adjust for multiplicity.
Our second objective is to describe and investigate a peculiar discrepancy
between fully Bayes and empirical-Bayes variable selection. This discrepancy
seems to arise from a different source than the failure to account for uncer-
tainty in the empirical-Bayes estimate—the usual issue in such problems.
Indeed, even when the empirical-Bayes estimate converges asymptotically
to the true hyperparameter value, the potential for a serious difference re-
mains.
The existence of such a discrepancy between fully Bayesian answers and
empirical-Bayes answers—especially one that persists even in the limit—
is of immediate interest to Bayesians, who often use empirical Bayes as a
computational simplification. But the discrepancy is also of interest to non-
Bayesians for at least two reasons.
First, frequentist complete-class theorems suggest that if an empirical-
Bayes analysis does not approximate some fully Bayesian analysis, then it
may be suboptimal and needs alternative justification. Such justifications
can be found for a variety of situations in George and Foster (2000), Efron
et al. (2001), Johnstone and Silverman (2004), Bogdan, Ghosh and Zak-
Szatkowska (2008), Cui and George (2008), Bogdan, Chakrabarti and Ghosh
(2008) and Bogdan, Ghosh and Tokdar (2008).
Second, theoretical and numerical investigations of the discrepancy re-
vealed some unsettling properties of the standard empirical-Bayes analysis
in variable selection. Of most concern is that empirical Bayes has the po-
tential to collapse to a degenerate solution, resulting in an inappropriate
statement of certainty in the selected regression model. As a simple exam-
ple, suppose the usual variable-selection prior is used, where each variable is
presumed to be in the model independently with an unknown common prob-
ability p. A common empirical-Bayes method is to estimate p by marginal
maximum likelihood (or Type-II maximum likelihood, as it is commonly
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called; see Section 3.2). This estimated pˆ is then used to determine the pos-
terior probabilities of models. This procedure will be shown to have the
startlingly inappropriate property of assigning final probability 1 to either
the full model or the intercept-only (null) model whenever the full (or null)
model has the largest marginal likelihood, even if this marginal likelihood is
only slightly larger than that of the next-best model.
This is certainly not the first situation in which the Type-II MLE ap-
proach to empirical Bayes has been shown to have problems. But the un-
usual character of the problem in variable selection seems not to have been
recognized.
In bringing this issue to light, our goal is not to criticize empirical-
Bayes analysis per se. Indeed, this paper will highlight many virtues of the
empirical-Bayes approach to variable selection, especially compared to the
nonadaptive model prior probabilities that are often used for variable selec-
tion. Our primary goal is comparative, rather than evaluative, in nature. In
particular, we wish to explore the implications of the above discrepancy for
Bayesians, who are likely to view empirical Bayes as an approximation to
full Bayes analysis, and who wish to understand when the approximation
is a good one. We recognize that others have alternative goals for empirical
Bayes, and that these goals do not involve approximating full Bayes analysis.
Also, there are non-Bayesian alternatives to marginal maximum likelihood
in estimating p, as shown in some of the above papers. The results in this
paper suggest that such alternatives be seriously considered by those wishing
to adopt the empirical-Bayes approach, especially in potentially degenerate
situations.
Section 2 introduces notation. Section 3 gives a brief historical and method-
ological overview of multiplicity correction for Bayesian variable selection,
and focuses on the issue of clarifying the source and nature of the correction.
Sections 4 and 5 introduce a theoretical framework for characterizing the
differences between fully Bayesian and empirical-Bayes analyses, and gives
several examples and theoretical results concerning the differences. Section 6
presents numerical results indicating the practical nature of the differences,
through a simulation experiment and a practical example. Section 7 gives
further discussion of the results.
2. Preliminaries.
2.1. Notation. Consider the usual problem of variable selection in linear
regression. Given a vector Y of n responses and an n×m design matrix X,
the goal is to select k predictors out of m possible ones for fitting a model
of the form
Yi = α+Xij1βj1 + · · ·+Xijkβjk + εi(1)
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for some {j1, . . . , jk} ⊂ {1, . . . ,m}, where εi i.i.d.∼ N(0, φ−1) for an unknown
variance φ−1.
All models are assumed to include an intercept term α. LetM0 denote the
null model with only this intercept term, and let MF denote the full model
with all covariates under consideration. The full model thus has parame-
ter vector θ′ = (α,β′), β′ = (β1, . . . , βm)
′. Submodels Mγ are indexed by a
binary vector γ of length m indicating a set of kγ ≤m nonzero regression
coefficients βγ :
γi =
{
0, if βi = 0,
1, if βi 6= 0.
It is most convenient to represent model uncertainty as uncertainty in
γ, a random variable that takes values in the discrete space {0,1}m, which
has 2m members. Inference relies upon the prior probability of each model,
p(Mγ), along with the marginal likelihood of the data under each model:
f(Y |Mγ) =
∫
f(Y | θγ , φ)π(θγ , φ)dθγ dφ,(2)
where π(θγ , φ) is the prior for model-specific parameters. These together
define, up to a constant, the posterior probability of a model:
p(Mγ |Y)∝ p(Mγ)f(Y |Mγ).(3)
Let Xγ denote the columns of the full design matrix X given by the
nonzero elements of γ, and let X∗γ denote the concatenation (1 Xγ), where
1 is a column of ones corresponding to the intercept α. For simplicity, we
will assume that all covariates have been centered so that 1 and Xγ are
orthogonal. We will also assume that the common choice π(α) = 1 is made
for the parameter α in each model [see Berger, Pericchi and Varshavsky
(1998) for a justification of this choice of prior].
Often all models will have small posterior probability, in which case more
useful summaries of the posterior distribution are quantities such as the
posterior inclusion probabilities of the individual variables:
pi =Pr(γi 6= 0 |Y) =
∑
γ
1γi=1 · p(Mγ |Y).(4)
These quantities also define the median-probability model, which is the
model that includes those covariates having posterior inclusion probability
at least 1/2. Under many circumstances, this model has greater predictive
power than the most probable model [Barbieri and Berger (2004)].
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2.2. Priors for model-specific parameters. There is an extensive body of
literature confronting the difficulties of Bayesian model choice in the face
of weak prior information. These difficulties arise due to the obvious de-
pendence of the marginal likelihoods in (2) upon the choice of priors for
model-specific parameters. In general, one cannot use improper priors on
these parameters, since this leaves the resulting Bayes factors defined only
up to an arbitrary multiplicative constant.
This paper chiefly uses null-based g-priors [Zellner (1986)] for computing
the marginal likelihoods in (2); explicit expressions can be found in the
Appendix. See Liang et al. (2008) for a recent discussion of g-priors, and
mixtures thereof, for variable selection.
3. Approaches to multiple testing.
3.1. Bayes factors, Ockham’s razor and multiplicity. In both Bayes and
empirical-Bayes variable selection, the marginal likelihood contains a built-in
penalty for model complexity that is often called the Bayesian “Ockham’s-
razor effect” [Jefferys and Berger (1992)]. This penalty arises in integrating
the likelihood across a higher-dimensional parameter space under the more
complex model, resulting in a more diffuse predictive distribution for the
data.
While this is a penalty against more complex models, it is not a multiple-
testing penalty. Observe that the Bayes factor between two fixed models will
not change as more possible variables are thrown into the mix, and hence
will not exert control over the number of false positives as m grows large.
Instead, multiplicity must be handled through the choice of prior proba-
bilities of models. The earliest recognition of this idea seems to be that of
Jeffreys in 1939, who gave a variety of suggestions for apportioning proba-
bility across different kinds of model spaces [see Sections 1.6, 5.0 and 6.0 of
Jeffreys (1961), a later edition]. Jeffreys paid close attention to multiplicity
adjustment, which he called “correcting for selection.” In scenarios involving
an infinite sequence of nested models, for example, he recommended using
model probabilities that formed a convergent geometric series, so that the
prior odds ratio for each pair of neighboring models (i.e., those differing by
a single parameter) was a fixed constant. Another suggestion, appropriate
for more general contexts, was to give all models of size k a single lump of
probability to be apportioned equally among models of that size. Below, in
fact, the fully Bayesian solution to multiplicity correction will be shown to
have exactly this flavor.
It is interesting that, in the variable-selection problem, assigning all mod-
els equal prior probability (which is equivalent to assigning each variable
prior probability of 1/2 of being in the model) provides no multiplicity con-
trol. This is most obvious in the orthogonal situation, which can be viewed
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as m independent tests of Hi :βi = 0. If each of these tests has prior proba-
bility of 1/2, there will be no multiplicity control as m grows. Indeed, note
that this “pseudo-objective” prior reflects an a priori expected model size
of m/2 with a standard deviation of
√
m/2, meaning that the prior for the
fraction of included covariates becomes very tight around 1/2 as m grows.
See Bogdan, Ghosh and Tokdar (2008) for extensive discussion of this issue.
3.2. Variable-selection priors and empirical Bayes. The standard mod-
ern practice in Bayesian variable-selection problems is to treat variable in-
clusions as exchangeable Bernoulli trials with common success probability
p, which implies that the prior probability of a model is given by
p(Mγ | p) = pkγ (1− p)m−kγ(5)
with kγ representing the number of included variables in the model.
We saw above that selecting p= 1/2 does not provide multiplicity correc-
tion. Treating p as an unknown parameter to be estimated from the data
will, however, yield an automatic multiple-testing penalty. The intuition is
that, as m grows with the true k remaining fixed, the posterior distribution
of p will concentrate near 0, so that the situation is the same as if one had
started with a very low prior probability that a variable should be in the
model [Scott and Berger (2006)]. Note that one could adjust for multiplicity
subjectively, by specifying p to reflect subjective belief in the proportion of
variables that should be included. No fixed choice of p that is independent
of m, however, can adjust for multiplicity.
The empirical-Bayes approach to variable selection was popularized by
George and Foster (2000), and is a common strategy for treating the prior
inclusion probability p in (5) in a data-dependent way. The most common
approach is to estimate the prior inclusion probability by maximum likeli-
hood, maximizing the marginal likelihood of p summed over model space
(often called Type-II maximum likelihood):
pˆ= argmax
p∈[0,1]
∑
γ
p(Mγ | p) · f(Y |Mγ).(6)
One uses this in (5) to define the ex-post prior probabilities p(Mγ | pˆ) =
pˆkγ (1− pˆ)m−kγ , resulting in final model posterior probabilities
p(Mγ |Y)∝ pˆkγ · (1− pˆ)m−kγf(Y |Mγ).(7)
The EB solution pˆ can be found either by direct numerical optimization or
by the EM algorithm detailed in Liang et al. (2008). For an overview of
empirical-Bayes methodology, see Carlin and Louis (2000).
It is clear that the empirical-Bayes approach will control for multiplicity
in a straightforward way: if there are only k true variables andm grows large,
then pˆ→ 0. This will make it increasingly more difficult for all variables to
overcome the ever-stronger prior bias against their relevance.
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Fig. 1. Prior model probability versus model size.
3.3. A fully Bayesian version. Fully Bayesian variable-selection priors
have been discussed by Ley and Steel (2009), Cui and George (2008) and
Carvalho and Scott (2009), among others. These priors assume that p has a
Beta distribution, p∼Be(a, b), giving
p(Mγ) =
∫ 1
0
p(Mγ | p)π(p)dp= β(a+ kγ , b+m− kγ)
β(a, b)
,(8)
where β(·, ·) is the beta function. For the default choice of a= b= 1, implying
a uniform prior on p, this reduces to
p(Mγ) =
(kγ)!(m− kγ)!
(m+1)(m!)
=
1
m+ 1
(
m
kγ
)
−1
.(9)
We call these expressions deriving from the uniform prior on p the “fully
Bayes” version of variable selection priors, though of course many other
priors could be used (including those incorporating subject-area informa-
tion). Utilizing these prior probabilities in (3) yields the following posterior
probabilities:
p(Mγ |Y)∝ 1
m+1
(
m
kγ
)
−1
f(Y |Mγ).(10)
This has the air of paradox: in contrast to (7), where the multiplicity ad-
justment is apparent, here p has been marginalized away. How can p then
be adjusted by the data so as to induce a multiplicity-correction effect?
Figures 1 and 2 hint at the answer, which is that the multiplicity penalty
was always in the prior probabilities in (9) to begin with; it was just hidden.
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In Figure 1 the prior log-probability is plotted as a function of model size
for a particular value of m (in this case 30). This highlights the marginal
penalty that one must pay for adding an extra variable: in moving from
the null model to a model with one variable, the fully Bayesian prior favors
the simpler model by a factor of 30 (label A). This penalty is not uniform:
models of size 9, for example, are favored to those of size 10 by a factor of
only 2.1 (label B).
Figure 2 then shows these penalties getting steeper as one considers more
models. Adding the first variable incurs a 30-to-1 prior-odds penalty if one
tests 30 variables (label A as before), but a 60-to-1 penalty if one tests 60
variables. Similarly, the 10th-variable marginal penalty is about two-to-one
for 30 variables considered (label B), but would be about four-to-one for 60
variables.
We were careful above to distinguish this effect from the Ockham’s-razor
penalty coming from the marginal likelihoods. But marginal likelihoods are
clearly relevant. They determine where models will sit along the curve in
Figure 1, and thus will determine whether the prior-odds multiplicity penalty
for adding another variable to a good model will be more like 2, more like
30 or something else entirely. Indeed, note that, if only large models have
significant marginal likelihoods, then the “multiplicity penalty” will now
become a “multiplicity advantage,” as one is on the increasing part of the
curve in Figure 1. (This is also consistent with the empirical-Bayes answer:
if pˆ > 0.5, then the analysis will increase the chance of variables entering the
model.)
Interestingly, the uniform prior on p also gives every variable a marginal
prior inclusion probability of 1/2; these marginal probabilities are the same
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Fig. 2. Multiplicity penalties as m grows.
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Table 1
Posterior inclusion probabilities (×100) for the 10 real variables in the simulated data,
along with the number of false positives (posterior inclusion probability greater than 1/2)
from the “pure noise” columns in the design matrix. Marginal likelihoods were calculated
(under Zellner–Siow priors) by enumerating the model space in the m= 11 and m= 20
cases, and by 5 million iterations of the feature-inclusion stochastic-search algorithm
[Berger and Molina (2005), Scott and Carvalho (2008)] in the m= 50 and m= 100 cases
Method and number of noise variables
Uncorrected Fully Bayes Oracle Bayes Empirical Bayes
Signal 1 10 40 90 1 10 40 90 1 10 40 90 1 10 40 90
−1.08 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
−0.84 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 98 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
−0.74 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
+0.63 99 99 99 99 99 99 92 73 99 99 97 87 99 99 93 80
−0.51 97 97 99 99 91 94 71 34 99 97 85 52 93 95 74 44
+0.41 92 91 99 99 96 86 56 22 99 91 72 35 97 88 60 25
+0.35 77 77 99 99 89 68 30 05 97 77 45 11 91 72 35 07
−0.30 29 28 28 12 55 24 04 00 79 28 06 01 64 25 04 01
+0.18 26 28 24 27 51 25 03 01 79 28 04 01 62 24 04 01
+0.07 21 24 05 01 45 21 03 01 70 24 05 01 56 22 03 01
FPs 0 2 5 10 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 1 0
as those induced by the “pseudo-objective” choice of p= 1/2. Yet because
probability is apportioned among models in a very different way, profoundly
different behaviors emerge.
For example, Table 1 compares these two regimes on a simulated data
set for which the true value of k was fixed at 10. The goal of the study
is, in essence, to understand how posterior probabilities adapt to situations
of increasingly egregious “data dredging,” where a set of true covariates is
tested in the presence of an ever-larger group of spurious covariates. We
used a simulated m= 100 design matrix of N(0,1) covariates and 10 regres-
sion coefficients that differed from zero, along with 90 coefficients that were
identically zero. The table summarizes the posterior inclusion probabilities
of the 10 real variables as we test them along with an increasing number of
noise variables (first 1, then 10, 40 and 90). It also indicates how many false
positives (defined as having posterior inclusion probability ≥ 0.5) are found
among the noise variables. Here, “uncorrected” refers to giving all models
equal prior probability by setting p= 1/2. “Oracle Bayes” is the result from
choosing p to reflect the known fraction of nonzero covariates.
The following points can be observed:
• The fully Bayes and empirical Bayes procedures both exhibit clear multi-
plicity adjustment: as the number of noise variables increases, the poste-
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Table 2
Posterior inclusion probabilities for the important main effects,
quadratic effects and cross-product effects for ozone-concentration
data under g-priors. Key: p= 1/2 implies that all models have equal
prior probability; FB is fully Bayes; EB is empirical Bayes
p= 1/2 FB EB
x1 0.83 0.42 0.54
x2 0.13 0.03 0.05
x3 0.09 0.02 0.03
x4 0.94 0.73 0.84
x5 0.33 0.06 0.10
x6 0.38 0.07 0.10
x7 0.34 0.36 0.29
x8 0.78 0.74 0.77
x9 0.20 0.03 0.05
x10 0.96 0.96 0.97
x1–x1 1.00 0.97 0.99
x9–x9 0.95 0.82 0.91
x1–x2 0.48 0.16 0.24
x4–x7 0.33 0.10 0.15
x6–x8 0.43 0.25 0.34
x7–x8 0.31 0.13 0.18
x7–x10 0.71 0.86 0.85
rior inclusion probabilities of variables decrease. The uncorrected Bayesian
analysis shows no such adjustment and can, rather bizarrely, sometimes
have the posterior inclusion probabilities increase as noise variables are
added.
• On the simulated data, proper multiplicity adjustment yields reasonably
strong control over false positives, in the sense that the number of false
positives appears bounded (and small) as m increases. In contrast, the
number of false positives appears to be increasing linearly for the uncor-
rected Bayesian analysis, as would be expected.
• The full Bayes, empirical Bayes and oracle Bayes answers are all qual-
itatively (though not quantitatively) similar; indeed, if one adopted the
(median probability model) prescription of selecting those variables with
posterior inclusion probability greater than 1/2, they would both always
select the same variables, except in two instances.
The differences between corrected and uncorrected analyses are quite
stark, and calls into question the use of nonadaptive priors in situations
with large numbers of potentially spurious covariates. For example, Table 2
shows the posterior inclusion probabilities for a model of ozone concentra-
tion levels outside Los Angeles that includes 10 atmospheric variables along
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with all squared terms and second-order interactions (m = 65). Probabili-
ties are given for uncorrected (p= 1/2), empirical Bayes and fully Bayesian
analyses. All variables appear uniformly less impressive when adjusted for
multiplicity.
Other examples of such multiplicity correction put into practice can be
found throughout the literature. For nonparametric problems, see Gopalan
and Berry (1998); for gene-expression studies, see Do, Muller and Tang
(2005); for econometrics, see Ley and Steel (2009); for Gaussian graphical
models, see Carvalho and Scott (2009); and for time-series data, see Scott
(2009).
4. Theoretical comparison of Bayes and empirical Bayes.
4.1. Motivation. The previous section showed some examples where fully
Bayes and empirical-Bayes methods gave qualitatively similar results. While
this rough correspondence between the two approaches does seem to hold in
a wide variety of applied problems, we now turn attention to the question
of when, and how, it fails.
We begin with a surprising lemma that indicates the need for caution
with empirical-Bayes methods in variable selection. The lemma refers to
the variable-selection problem, with the prior variable inclusion probabil-
ity p being estimated by marginal (or Type-II) maximum likelihood in the
empirical-Bayes approach.
Lemma 4.1. In the variable-selection problem, if M0 has the (strictly)
largest marginal likelihood, then the Type-II MLE estimate of p is pˆ = 0.
Similarly, if MF has the (strictly) largest marginal likelihood, then pˆ= 1.
Proof. Since p(Mγ) sums to 1 over γ, the marginal likelihood of p
satisfies
f(Y) =
∑
Γ
f(Y |Mγ)p(Mγ)≤max
γ∈Γ
f(Y |Mγ).(11)
Furthermore, the inequality is strict under the conditions of the lemma (be-
cause the designated marginals are strictly largest), unless the prior as-
signs p(Mγ) = 1 to the maximizing marginal likelihood. The only way that
p(Mγ) = p
kγ · (1 − p)m−kγ can equal 1 is for p to be 0 or 1 and for the
model to be M0 or MF , respectively. At these values of p, equality is indeed
achieved in (11) under the stated conditions, and the results follow. 
As a consequence, the empirical-Bayes approach here would assign final
probability 1 to M0 whenever it has the largest marginal likelihood, and
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final probability 1 to MF whenever it has the largest marginal likelihood.
These are clearly very unsatisfactory answers.
The above lemma does highlight a specific, undesirable property of the
empirical-Bayes approach to variable selection—one whose practical signifi-
cance we investigate by simulation in Section 6. For the most part, however,
the rest of our results are of a fundamentally different character. We will not
be evaluating either the fully Bayes or the empirical-Bayes approach accord-
ing to an objective yardstick, such as how well each one does at recovering
true relationships or suppressing false ones. Instead, we focus on compar-
ing the two approaches to each other in a more formal way. As mentioned
above, our fundamental goal is to understand when, and how, empirical
Bayes corresponds asymptotically to full Bayes analysis. Such a compari-
son is certainly of interest, both to Bayesians who might consider empirical
Bayes as a computational approximation, and to frequentists for the reasons
mentioned in the Introduction.
To explore the difference between these two approaches, it is useful to
abstract the problem somewhat and suppose simply that the data Y have
sampling density f(Y | θ), and let θ ∈ Θ have prior density π(θ | λ) for
some unknown hyperparameter λ ∈ Λ. Empirical-Bayes methodology typi-
cally proceeds by estimating λ from the data using a consistent estimator.
[The Type-II MLE approach would estimate λ by the maximizer of the
marginal likelihood m(Y | λ) = ∫Λ f(Y | θ)π(θ | λ)dθ, and this will typi-
cally be consistent in empirical-Bayes settings.] It is then argued that (at
least asymptotically) the Bayesian analysis with λˆ will be equivalent to the
Bayesian analysis if one knew λ. (This claim is most interesting when the
prior for λˆ is unknown; if it is known, then there are also strong frequentist
reasons to use this prior in lieu of empirical Bayes.)
To contrast this with a full Bayesian analysis, suppose we have a prior
density π(λ) for λ and a target function ψ(θ,Y | λ). For instance, ψ could
be the posterior mean of θ given λ and Y, or it could be the conditional
posterior distribution of θ given λ and Y. The empirical-Bayesian claim, in
this context, would be that∫
Λ
ψ(θ,Y | λ)π(λ |Y)dλ≈ ψ(θ,Y | λˆ),(12)
that is, that the full Bayesian answer on the left can be well approximated by
the empirical-Bayes answer on the right. The justification for (12) would be
based on the fact that, typically, π(λ | Y) will collapse to a point mass
near the true λ as the sample size increases, so that (12) will hold for
appropriately smooth functions ψ(θ,Y | λ) when the sample size is large.
There are typically better approximations to the left-hand side of (12),
such as the Laplace approximation. These, however, are focused on repro-
ducing the full-Bayes analysis through an analytic approximation, and are
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not “empirical-Bayes” per se. Likewise, higher-order empirical-Bayes anal-
ysis will likely yield better results here, but the issue is in realizing when
one needs to resort to such higher-order analysis in the first place, and in
understanding why this is so for problems such as variable selection.
That (12) could fail for nonsmooth ψ(θ,Y | λ) is no surprise. But what
may come as a surprise is that this failure can also occur for very common
functions.
Most notably, it fails for the conditional posterior density itself. Indeed,
in choosing ψ(θ,Y | λ) = π(θ | λ,Y), the left-hand side of (12) is just the
posterior density of θ given Y, which (by definition) can be written as
πF (θ |Y)∝ f(Y | θ)
∫
Λ
π(θ | λ)π(λ)dλ.(13)
On the other hand, for this choice of ψ, (12) becomes
πE(θ |Y)≈ π(θ |Y, λˆ)∝ f(Y | θ) · π(θ | λˆ),(14)
and the two expressions on the right-hand sides of (13) and (14) can be
very different. [This difference may not matter, of course; for instance, if
f(Y | θ) is extremely concentrated as a likelihood, the prior being used may
not matter.]
As an indication as to what goes wrong in (12) for this choice of ψ, note
that
πF (θ |Y) =
∫
Λ
π(θ | λ,Y) · π(λ |Y)dλ
=
∫
Λ
π(θ,λ |Y)
π(λ |Y) · π(λ |Y)dλ(15)
=
∫
Λ
f(Y | θ)π(θ | λ)π(λ)
f(Y)π(λ |Y) · π(λ |Y)dλ.(16)
Of course, these elementary calculations simply lead to (13) after further
algebra. But they illuminate the fact that, while π(λ |Y) may indeed be
collapsing to a point mass at the true λ, this term occurs in both the nu-
merator and the denominator of the integrand and therefore cancels. The
accuracy with which a point mass at λˆ approximates π(λ |Y) is thus essen-
tially irrelevant from the standpoint of full Bayes analysis.
4.2. Comparison using Kullback–Leibler convergence. Our goal, then, is
to understand when (13) and (14) will yield the same answers, in an asymp-
totic sense. The closeness of these two distributions will be measured by
Kullback–Leibler divergence, a standard measure for comparing a pair of
distributions P and Q over parameter space Θ:
KL(P ‖Q) =
∫
Θ
P (θ) log
(
P (θ)
Q(θ)
)
dθ.(17)
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Kullback–Leibler divergence can be used to formalize the notion of empirical-
Bayes convergence to fully Bayesian analysis as follows:
KL empirical-Bayes convergence. Suppose the data Y and parameter θ
have joint distribution p(Y,θ | λ), where θ ∈Θ is of dimensionm, and where
λ ∈ Λ is of fixed dimension that does not grow with m. Let πE = π(ψ(θ) |
Y, λˆ) be the empirical-Bayes posterior distribution for some function of
the parameter ψ(θ), and let πF = π(ψ(θ) |Y) =
∫
Λ π(ψ(θ) |Y,λ) · π(λ)dλ
be the corresponding fully Bayesian posterior under the prior π(λ). If, for
every λ ∈ Λ, KL(πF ‖πE)→ 0 in probability [expectation] under p(Y,θ |
λ) as m→∞, then πE will be said to be KL-convergent in probability
[expectation] to the fully Bayesian posterior πF .
Note that KL convergence is defined with respect to a particular function
of the parameter, along with a particular prior distribution on the hyperpa-
rameter. The intuition is the following. Suppose that in trying to estimate
a given function ψ(θ), it is possible to construct a reasonable prior π(λ)
such that the KL-convergence criterion is met. Then the empirical Bayes
and full Bayes analysis will disagree for every finite sample size, but are at
least tending toward agreement asymptotically. If, on the other hand, it is
not possible to find a reasonable prior π(λ) that leads to KL convergence,
then estimating ψ(θ) by empirical Bayes is dubious from the fully Bayesian
perspective. A Bayesian could not replicate such a procedure even asymp-
totically, while a frequentist may be concerned by complete-class theorems.
(A “reasonable” prior is a necessarily vague notion, but obviously excludes
things such as placing a point mass at λˆ.)
Instead of KL divergence, of course, one might instead use another dis-
tance or divergence measure. The squared Hellinger distance is one such
possibility:
H2(P ‖Q) = 1
2
∫
Θ
(
√
P (θ)−
√
Q(θ))2 dθ.
Most of the subsequent results, however, use KL divergence because of its
familiarity and analytical tractability.
4.3. An orthogonal example. As a simple illustration of the above ideas,
consider the following two examples of empirical-Bayes analysis. The first
example satisfies the convergence criterion; the second does not. Both exam-
ples concern the same sampling model, in which we observe a series of con-
ditionally independent random variables yi ∼ N(θi,1), and where we know
that θi ∼N(µ,1). Thus, the hyperparameter λ= µ here. Let θ = (θ1, . . . , θm)
and y= (y1, . . . , ym).
Alternatively, this can be thought of as an orthogonal regression problem
where both the dimension and number of samples are growing at the same
BAYES AND EMPIRICAL-BAYES MULTIPLICITY ADJUSTMENT 15
rate: y =Xθ + ε, with X being the m×m identity matrix. This framing
makes the connection to variable selection much more plain.
The natural empirical-Bayes estimate of µ is the sample mean µˆE = y¯,
which is clearly consistent for µ as m→∞ and converges at the usual 1/√m
rate. A standard hyperprior in a fully Bayesian analysis, on the other hand,
would be µ∼N(0,A) for some specified A; the objective hyperprior π(µ) = 1
is essentially the limit of this as A→∞. Using the expressions given in, for
example, Berger (1985), the empirical-Bayes and full Bayes posteriors are
πE(θ | y, µˆE) = N( 12(y+ y¯1), 12I),(18)
πF (θ | y) = N
(
1
2
(y+ y¯1)−
(
1
mA+2
)
y¯1,
1
2
I+
A
2(mA+ 2)
(11t)
)
,(19)
where I is the identity matrix and 1 is a column vector of all ones.
Example 1. Suppose only the first normal mean, θ1, is of interest,
meaning that the target function ψ(θ) = θ1. Then sending A→∞ yields
πE(θ1 | y, µˆE) = N([y1 + y¯]/2,1/2),(20)
πF (θ1 | y) = N([y1 + y¯]/2,1/2 + [2m]−1).(21)
It is easy to check that KL(πF ‖πE)→ 0 as m→∞. Hence, πE(θ1) arises
from a KL-convergent EB procedure under a reasonable prior, since it cor-
responds asymptotically to the posterior given by the objective prior on the
hyperparameter µ.
Example 2. Suppose now that θ, the entire vector of means, is of inter-
est [hence, ψ(θ) = θ]. The relevant distributions are then the full πE and πF
given in (18) and (19), with parameters (θˆE ,ΣE) and (θˆF ,ΣF ), respectively.
A straightforward computation shows that KL(πF ‖πE) is given by
KL=
1
2
[
log
(
detΣE
detΣF
)
+ tr(Σ−1E ΣF ) + (θˆE − θˆF )tΣ−1E (θˆE − θˆF )−m
]
(22)
=
1
2
[
− log
(
1 +
mA
mA+2
)
+
mA
mA+2
+ 2m
(
1
mA+2
)2
y¯2
]
.
For any nonzero choice of A and for any finite value of the hyperparameter
µ, it is clear that under p(y,θ | µ) the quantity [2m/(mA+ 2)2] · y¯2→ 0 in
probability as m→∞. Hence, for any value of A (including A =∞), the
KL divergence in (22) converges to (1− log 2)/2> 0.
Of course, this only considers priors of the form µ ∼ N(0,A), but the
asymptotic normality of the posterior for µ can be used to prove the result for
essentially any prior that satisfies the usual regularity conditions, suggesting
that there is no reasonable prior for which πE(θ) is KL-convergent.
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The crucial difference here is that, in the second example, the parameter of
interest increases in dimension as information about the hyperparameter µ
accumulates. This is not the usual situation in asymptotic analysis. Hence,
even as θˆE and θˆF are getting closer to each other elementwise, the KL
divergence does not shrink to 0 as expected.
Two further comments are in order. First, a similar argument shows that
the fully Bayes posterior is not KL-convergent to the so-called “oracle poste-
rior” π(θ | y, µT )—that is, the conditional posterior distribution for θ, given
the true value of µ. This is not a source of worry for Bayesians, but it makes
clear that the disagreement between EB and FB procedures cuts both ways,
and is not merely a “failure” of empirical-Bayes; if a non-Bayesian’s goal is to
reconstruct the oracle posterior, this could be achieved by empirical-Bayes
analysis but not by full Bayes.
Second, the situation described above has the sample size n equal to
the number of unknown parameters m. If n grows relative to m, the full
Bayes and empirical-Bayes/oracle posteriors can indeed be KL-convergent.
For instance, suppose there are r independent replicate observations for each
µi. Then a similar calculation shows that KL(πF ‖πE) =O(1/r) as r→∞,
so that KL convergence between the two approaches would obtain.
5. Results for variable selection. For the variable-selection problem, ex-
plicit expressions for the KL divergence between empirical-Bayes and fully
Bayes procedures are not available. It is also quite difficult to characterize
the sampling distribution of pˆ, the empirical-Bayes estimate for the prior in-
clusion probability p. It is therefore not yet possible to give a general char-
acterization of whether, and when, the empirical-Bayes variable-selection
procedure is KL-convergent, in the sense defined above, to a fully Bayesian
procedure.
Three interesting sets of results are available, however. First and most
simply, we can characterize the KL divergence between the prior probability
distributions of the fully Bayesian and empirical-Bayesian procedures. Sec-
ond, we can characterize the limiting expected Kullback–Leibler divergence
between EB and FB posteriors, even if we cannot characterize the limiting
KL divergence itself. Third, we can compare the asymptotic behavior of the
full Bayes and empirical-Bayes prior model probabilities for models in a size
neighborhood of the true model.
We denote the empirical-Bayes prior distribution over model indicators
by pE(Mγ) and the fully-Bayesian distribution (with uniform prior on p)
by pF (Mγ). Similarly, after observing data D, we write pE(Mγ | Y) and
pF (Mγ |Y) for the posterior distributions.
5.1. Prior KL divergence. The first two theorems prove the existence of
lower bounds on how close the EB and FB priors can be, and show that
BAYES AND EMPIRICAL-BAYES MULTIPLICITY ADJUSTMENT 17
these lower bounds become arbitrarily large as the number of tests m goes
to infinity. We refer to these lower bounds as “information gaps,” and give
them in both Kullback–Leibler (Theorem 5.1) and Hellinger (Theorem 5.2)
flavors.
Theorem 5.1. Let G(m) = minpˆKL(pF (Mγ)‖pE(Mγ)). Then G(m)→
∞ as m→∞.
Proof. The KL divergence is
KL =
m∑
k=0
1
m+ 1
[
log
(
1
m+1
(
m
k
)
−1)
− log(pˆk · (1− pˆ)m−k)
]
=− log(m+ 1)(23)
− 1
m+ 1
m∑
k=0
[
log
(
m
k
)
+ k log pˆ+ (m− k) log(1− pˆ)
]
.
This is minimized for pˆ= 1/2 regardless of m, meaning that
G(m) =− log(m+1)− 1
m+ 1
m∑
k=0
[
log
(
m
k
)
+m log(1/2)
]
(24)
=m log 2− log(m+ 1)− 1
m+1
m∑
k=0
log
(
m
k
)
.
The first (linear) term in (24) dominates the second (logarithmic) term,
whereas results in Gould (1964) show the third term to be asymptotically
linear in m with slope 1/2. Hence, G(m) grows linearly with m, with asymp-
totic positive slope of log 2− 1/2. 
Theorem 5.2. Let H2(m) =minpˆH
2(pF (Mγ)‖pE(Mγ)). Then H2(m)→
1 as m→∞.
Proof.
H2(pF (Mγ)‖pE(Mγ)) = 1− 1√
m+1
m∑
k=0
√(
m
k
)
pˆk(1− pˆ)m−k.(25)
This distance is also minimized for pˆ= 1/2, meaning that
H2(m) = 1− (m+ 1)−1/2 · 2−m/2 ·
m∑
k=0
√(
m
k
)
.(26)
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A straightforward application of Stirling’s approximation to the factorial
function shows that
lim
m→∞
[
(m+1)−1/2 · 2−m/2 ·
m∑
k=0
√(
m
k
)]
= 0,(27)
from which the result follows immediately. 
In summary, the ex-post prior distribution associated with the EB pro-
cedure is particularly troubling when the number of tests m grows without
bound. On the one hand, when the true value of k remains fixed or grows at
a rate slower than m—that is, when concerns over false positives become the
most trenchant, and the case for a Bayesian procedure exhibiting strong mul-
tiplicity control becomes the most convincing—then pˆ→ 0 and the EB prior
pE(Mγ) becomes arbitrarily bad as an approximation to pF (Mγ). (Here, the
correction under the empirical-Bayes approach will be more aggressive com-
pared with the Bayesian approach, and some may consider this additional
aggressiveness to be a source of strength.) On the other hand, if the true
k is growing at the same rate as m, then the best one can hope for is that
pˆ= 1/2. And even then, the information gap between pF (Mγ) and pE(Mγ)
grows linearly without bound (for KL divergence), or converges to 1 (for
Hellinger distance).
5.2. Posterior KL divergence. We now prove a theorem showing that,
under very mild conditions, the expected KL divergence between FB and EB
posteriors for the variable-selection problem is infinite. This version assumes
that the error precision φ is fixed, but the generalization to an unknown φ
is straightforward.
Theorem 5.3. In the variable-selection problem, let m, n > m, and
φ > 0 be fixed. Suppose Xγ is of full rank for all models and that the family of
priors for model-specific parameters, {π(βγ)}, is such that p(βγ = 0)< 1 for
all Mγ . Then, for any true model M
T
γ
, the expected posterior KL divergence
E[KL{pF (Mγ |Y)‖pE(Mγ |Y)}] under this true model is infinite.
Proof. The posterior KL divergence is
KL(pF (Mγ |Y)‖pE(Mγ |Y)) =
∑
Γ
pF (Mγ |Y) · log
(
pF (Mγ |Y)
pE(Mγ |Y)
)
.(28)
This is clearly infinite if there exists a model Mγ for which pE(Mγ |Y) = 0
but pF (Mγ |Y)> 0. Since the fully Bayesian posterior assigns nonzero prob-
ability to all models, this condition is met whenever the empirical-Bayesian
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solution is pˆ = 0 or pˆ = 1. Thus, it suffices to show that pˆ will be 0 with
positive probability under any true model.
Assume without loss of generality that φ = 1. Recall that we are also
assuming that π(α) = 1 for all models, and that the intercept is orthogonal
to all other covariates. Letting βγ∗ = (α,βγ)
t for model Mγ , and letting
L(·) stand for the likelihood, the marginal likelihood for any model can then
be written
f(Y |Mγ) =L(βˆ∗γ) ·
√
2π/n
∫
R
kγ
g(βγ)π(βγ)dβγ ,(29)
where
g(βγ) = exp{−12(βγ − βˆγ)tXtγXγ(βγ − βˆγ)}.
The Bayes factor for comparing the null model to any model is
Bγ(Y) =
f(Y |M0)
f(Y |Mγ) ,
which from (29) is clearly continuous as a function of Y for every γ. Eval-
uated at Y= 0 (so that βˆγ then equals 0), this Bayes factor satisfies
Bγ(0) =
(∫
R
kγ
exp
{
−1
2
βt
γ
Xt
γ
Xγβγ
}
π(βγ)dβγ
)
−1
> 1(30)
for each Mγ under the assumptions of the theorem.
By continuity, for every modelMγ there exists an εγ such that Bγ(Y)> 1
for any |Y|< εγ . Let ε∗ =minγ εγ . Then for Y satisyfing |Y|< ε∗, Bγ(Y)>
1 for all nonnull models, meaning that M0 will have the largest marginal
likelihood. By Lemma 4.1, pˆ= 0 when such a Y is observed.
But under any model, there is positive probability of observing |Y|< ε∗
for any positive ε∗, since this set has positive Lebesgue measure. Hence,
regardless of the true model, there is positive probability that the KL diver-
gence KL(pF (Mγ |Y)‖pE(Mγ |Y)) is infinite under the sampling distribu-
tion p(Y |Mγ), and so its expectation is clearly infinite. 
Since the expected KL divergence is infinite for any numberm of variables
being tested, and for any true model, it is clear that E(KL) does not converge
to 0 as m→∞. This, of course, is a weaker conclusion than would be a lack
of KL convergence in probability.
In Theorem 5.3 the expectation is with respect to the sampling distri-
bution under a specific model Mγ , with βγ either fixed or marginalized
away with respect to a prior distribution. But this result implies an infi-
nite expectation with respect to other reasonable choices of the expectation
distribution—for example, under the Bernoulli sampling model for γ in (5)
with fixed prior inclusion probability p.
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5.3. Asymptotic behavior of prior model probabilities under EB and FB
procedures. While interesting, the results in the previous two sections do
not consider the usual type of asymptotic comparison, namely, how do the
full Bayes and empirical Bayes posterior distributions converge as m→∞?
It is not clear that such asymptotic comparisons are possible in general,
although very interesting results can be obtained in particular contexts [cf.
Bogdan, Chakrabarti and Ghosh (2008), Bogdan, Ghosh and Tokdar (2008)].
A rather general insight related to such comparison can be obtained,
however, by focusing on the prior probabilities of “high posterior” models,
as m→∞. To do so, we first need an approximation to the full Bayes prior
probability ofMγ , given in the following lemma. The proof is straightforward
Laplace approximation, and is omitted.
Lemma 5.4. As m→∞, consider models of size kγ such that kγ/m is
bounded away from 0 and 1. Then the Bayesian prior probability of Mγ with
prior π(p) is
pF (Mγ) =
∫ 1
0
p(Mγ | p)π(p)dp
=
(
kγ
m
)kγ(
1− kγ
m
)m−kγ[(2π)(kγ/m)(1− kγ/m)π(kγ/m)
m
]1/2
×{1 + o(1)},
providing π(·) is continuous and nonzero.
Now suppose pT is the true prior variable inclusion probability and con-
sider the most favorable situation for empirical Bayes analysis, in which the
empirical Bayes estimate for pT satisfies
pˆ= pT (1 + εE) where εE is O
(
1√
m
)
as m→∞.(31)
It is not known in general when this holds, but it does hold in exchangeable
contexts where each variable is in or out of the model with unknown prob-
ability p, since such problems are equivalent to mixture model problems.
For models far from the true model, the prior model probabilities given by
the Bayesian and empirical Bayesian approaches can be extremely different.
Hence, it is most interesting to focus on models that are close to the true
model for the comparison. In particular, we restrict attention to models
whose size differs from the true model by O(
√
m).
Theorem 5.5. Suppose the true model size kT satisfies kT /m = pT +
O(1/
√
m) as m→∞, where 0< pT < 1. Consider all models Mγ such that
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kT − kγ =O(
√
m), and consider the optimal situation for EB in which (31)
holds. Then the ratio of the prior probabilities assigned to such models by
the Bayes approach and the empirical Bayes approach satisfies
pF (Mγ)
pE(Mγ)
=
(
kγ
m
)kγ(
1− kγ
m
)m−kγ[
(2π)
(
kγ
m
)(
1− kγ
m
)
π
(
kγ
m
)]1/2
×m−1/2{1 + o(1)}
× ((pˆ)kγ (1− pˆ)m−kγ )−1
=O
(
1√
m
)
,
providing π(·) is continuous and nonzero.
Proof. Note that
pE(Mγ) = (pˆ)
kγ (1− pˆ)m−kγ = {pT (1 + εE)}kγ{1− pT (1 + εE)}m−kγ .(32)
Taking the log and performing a Taylor expansion yields
log pE(Mγ) = log{pkγT (1− pT )m−kγ}+ kγ log (1 + εE)
+ (m− kγ) log
{
1− pT
(1− pT )εE
}
= log{pkγT (1− pT )m−kγ}+ kγ{εE +O(ε2E)}
+ (m− kγ)
{
− pT
(1− pT )εE +O(ε
2
E)
}
= log{pkγT (1− pT )m−kγ}+ {kT +O(
√
m)}{εE +O(ε2E)}
+ {m− kT −O(
√
m)}
{
− pT
(1− pT )εE +O(ε
2
E)
}
= log{pkγT (1− pT )m−kγ}+O(
√
mεE) +O(mε
2
E)
= log{pkγT (1− pT )m−kγ}+O(1).
A nearly identical argument using Lemma 5.4 shows that the log Bayesian
prior probability for these models is
log{pF (Mγ)}= log{pkγT (1− pT )m−kγ} − log
√
m+O(1),(33)
from which the result is immediate. 
So we see that, even under the most favorable situation for the empirical-
Bayes analysis, and even when only considering models that are close to the
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true model in terms of model size, the prior probabilities assigned by the
Bayes approach are smaller by a factor of order 1/
√
m than those assigned
by the empirical-Bayes approach. The effect of this very significant difference
in prior probabilities will be context dependent, but the result does provide
a clear warning that the full Bayes and empirical-Bayes answers can differ—
even when m→∞ and even when there is sufficient information in the data
to guarantee the existence of a consistent estimator for pT .
The theorem also shows that the empirical-Bayes procedure provides a
better asymptotic approximation to the “oracle” prior probabilities, which
may be argued by some to be the main goal of empirical-Bayes analysis. At
least for this ideal scenario, the EB approach assigns larger prior probabili-
ties to models which are closer to the true model. Of course, this fact is not
especially relevant from the fully Bayesian perspective, and does not neces-
sarily counterbalance the problems associated with ignoring uncertainty in
the estimator for p.
Finally, this difference in prior probabilities will not always have a large
effect. For instance, if n→∞ at a fast enough rate compared with m, then
the Bayes and empirical-Bayes approach will typically agree simply because
all of the posterior mass will concentrate on a single model [i.e., one of the
marginal likelihoods f(Y |Mγ) will become dominant], and so the assigned
prior probabilities will be irrelevant.
6. Numerical investigation of empirical-Bayes variable selection. This
section presents numerical results that demonstrate practical, finite-sample
significance of some of the qualitative differences mentioned above. As in
the previous section, most of the investigation is phrased as a comparison of
empirical-Bayes and full Bayes, taken from the fully Bayesian perspective.
Note that m here is taken to be moderate (14 for the simulation study
and 22 for the real data set); the intent is to focus on the magnitude of
the difference that one can expect in variable selection problems of such
typical magnitude. Of course, such m are not large enough that one would
automatically expect the empirical-Bayes approach to provide an accurate
estimate of p, and so differences are to be expected, but it is still useful to
see the magnitude of the differences. For a larger m situation, see Table 1;
for the largest m in that table, the full Bayes and empirical-Bayes answers
are much closer. The rationale for taking these values of m is that they allow
the model space to be enumerated, avoiding potential confounding effects
due to computational difficulties.
6.1. Results under properly specified priors. The following simulation
was performed 75,000 times for each of four different sample sizes:
1. Draw a random m×n design matrix X of independent N(0,1) covariates.
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Fig. 3. Distribution of pˆ in the simulation study (n= 60) with a correctly specified (uni-
form) prior for p. The gray bars indicated the number of times, among values of pˆ in the
extremal bins, that the empirical-Bayes solution collapsed to the degenerate pˆ= 0 or pˆ= 1.
2. Draw a random p ∼ U(0,1), and draw a sequence of m independent
Bernoulli trials with success probability p to yield a binary vector γ
encoding the true set of regressors.
3. Draw βγ , the vector of regression coefficients corresponding to the nonzero
elements of γ, from a Zellner–Siow prior. Set the other coefficients β
−γ
to 0.
4. Draw a random vector of responses Y ∼N(Xβ, I).
5. Using only X and Y, compute marginal likelihoods (assuming Zellner–
Siow priors) for all 2m possible models; use these quantities to compute
pˆ along with the EB and FB posterior distributions across model space.
In all cases m was fixed at 14, yielding a model space of size 16,384—large
enough to be interesting, yet small enough to be enumerated 75,000 times in
a row. We repeated the experiment for four different sample sizes (n = 16,
n= 30, n= 60 and n= 120) to simulate a variety of different m/n ratios.
Two broad patterns emerged from these experiments.
First, as Figure 3 shows, the EB procedure gives the degenerate pˆ = 0
or pˆ = 1 solution much too often. When n = 60, for example, almost 15%
of cases collapsed to pˆ= 0 or pˆ= 1. This is essentially the same fraction of
degenerate cases as when n = 16, which was 16%. This suggests that the
issues raised by Theorem 5.3 can be quite serious in practice, even when n
is large compared to m.
Second, even in nondegenerate situations, the two procedures often reached
very different conclusions about which covariates were important. Figure 4
shows frequent large discrepancies between the posterior inclusion proba-
bilities given by the EB and FB procedures. This happened even when n
was relatively large compared to the number of parameters being tested,
suggesting that even large sample sizes do not render a data set immune to
this difference. (Note that Figure 4 only depicts the differences that arise
when the empirical-Bayes solution does not collapse to either 0 or 1.)
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Fig. 4. Differences in all m inclusion probabilities between EB and FB analyses across
all nondegenerate cases (i.e., where the EB solution does not collapse to the boundary).
The percentage of points lying outside the boxplot whiskers (1.5 times the inter-quartile
range) are as follows: 14% for n= 16, 12% for n= 30, 8% for n= 60 and 7% for n= 120.
6.2. Results under improperly specified priors. The previous section
demonstrated that significant differences can exist between fully Bayesian
and empirical-Bayes variable selection in finite-sample settings. There was
an obvious bias, however, in that the fully Bayesian procedure was being
evaluated under its true prior distribution, with respect to which it is nec-
essarily optimal.
It is thus of interest to do a similar comparison for situations in which
the prior distribution is specified incorrectly: the fully Bayesian answers will
assume a uniform prior p, but p will actually be drawn from a nonuniform
distribution. We limit ourselves to discussion of the analogue of Figure 3 for
various situations, all with m= 14 and n= 60. Three different choices of the
true distribution for p were investigated, again with 75,000 simulated data
sets each:
1. p ∼ Be(3/2,3/2), yielding mainly moderate (but not uniform) values of
p.
2. p∼ Be(1,2), yielding mainly smaller values of p.
3. p ∼ 0.5 ·Be(1/2,8) + 0.5 · Be(8,1/2), yielding primarily values of p close
to 0 or 1.
The results are summarized in Figure 5. In each case the central pane
shows the true distribution of p, with the left pane showing the Bayesian
posterior means under the uniform prior and the right pane showing the
empirical-Bayes estimates pˆ.
As expected, the incorrectly specified Bayesian model tends to shrink
the estimated values of p back to the prior mean of 0.5. This tendency is
especially noticeable in Case 3, where the true distribution contains many
extreme values of p. This gives the illusion that empirical-Bayes tends to do
better here.
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Fig. 5. Distribution of pˆ (n= 60) in different versions of the simulation study, where the
fully Bayesian model had a misspecified (uniform) prior on p. The gray bars indicated the
number of times, among values of pˆ in the extremal bins, that the empirical-Bayes solution
collapsed to the degenerate pˆ= 0 or pˆ= 1.
Notice, however, the gray bars in the right-most panes. These bars indicate
the percentage of time, among values of pˆ that fall in the left- or right-most
bins of the histogram, that the empirical-Bayes solution is exactly 0 or 1,
respectively. For example, of the roughly 20,000 times that pˆ ∈ [0,0.1) in
Case 2, it was identically 0 more than 10,000 of those times. (The fully
Bayesian posterior mean, of course, is never exactly 0 or 1.)
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The bottom panel of Figure 5 shows that, paradoxically, where the fully
Bayesian model is most incorrect, its advantages over the empirical-Bayes
procedure are the strongest. In the mixture model giving many values of p
very close to 0 or 1, empirical Bayes collapses to a degenerate solution nearly
half the time. Even if the extremal model is true in most of these cases,
recall that the empirical-Bayes procedure would result in an inappropriate
statement of certainty in the model. Of course, this would presumably be
noticed and some correction would be entertained, but the frequency of
having to make the correction is itself worrisome.
In these cases, while the fully Bayesian posterior mean is necessarily
shrunk back to the prior mean, this shrinkage is not very severe, and the
uniform prior giving rise to such shrinkage can easily be modified if it is be-
lieved to be wrong. And in cases where the uniform prior is used incorrectly,
a slight amount of unwanted shrinkage seems a small price to pay for the
preservation of real prior uncertainty.
6.3. Results when p is fixed. We conducted a final version of the simula-
tion with p fixed at 3 different values: p= 0.10, p= 0.25, and p= 0.5. Figure
6 plots the estimated values of p under the fully Bayes and empirical-Bayes
procedures. (For the sake of visual clarity only the results from 2000 data
sets are shown.)
It is clear that for the smallest value of p = 0.1, the degenerate solution
pˆ = 0 occurs quite frequently. When p is moderate (as in the 0.25 or 0.5
cases), degeneracy occurs much less often.
It is also interesting to see the differences in how well the EB and FB anal-
ysis approximate the “oracle” inclusion probabilities, which are the posterior
inclusion probabilities one would compute if one knew the true Bernoulli
probability p. This can be measured by looking at the ℓ1 distance from the
oracle estimate:
ℓ1(pˆ, pˆ
or) =
m∑
j=1
|pˆj − pˆorj |,
where pˆorj is the oracle posterior inclusion probability for the jth variable.
The two procedures do quite similarly here, but with subtle differences.
For example, on the “sparse” (p = 0.1) case, the mean ℓ1 distance to the
oracle answer across all Monte Carlo draws was 0.36 for the EB posterior,
and 0.40 for the FB posterior. Yet the median ℓ1 distance to the oracle
answer was 0.27 for the FB posterior, and 0.30 for the EB posterior.
These differences were largely consistent across other values of p. This
suggests that, while the FB procedure seems to reconstruct the oracle pos-
terior inclusion probabilities better for a larger number of data sets (such
as when the empirical-Bayes answer is degenerate), it tends to miss by a
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Fig. 6. Distribution of pˆ (n= 60) in the fixed-p versions of the simulation study (2000
subsamples of the fake data sets). The dashed line indicates the true value of p.
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larger amount than the EB procedure does. This results in a worse level
of average performance for the FB procedure in reconstructing the oracle
posterior inclusion probabilities.
6.4. Example: Determinants of economic growth. The following data set
serves to illustrate the differences between EB and FB answers in a scenario
of typical size, complexity and m/n ratio.
Many econometricians have applied Bayesian methods to the problem
of GDP-growth regressions, where long-term economic growth is explained
in terms of various political, social and geographical predictors. Fernandez,
Ley and Steel (2001) popularized the use of Bayesian model averaging in the
field; Sala-i Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004) used a Bayes-like proce-
dure called BACE, similar to BIC-weighted OLS estimates, for selecting a
model; and Ley and Steel (2009) considered the effect of prior assumptions
(particularly the pseudo-objective p= 1/2 prior) on these regressions.
We study a subset of the data from Sala-i Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller
(2004) containing 22 covariates on 30 different countries. A data set of this
size allows the model space to be enumerated and the EB estimate pˆ to
be calculated explicitly, which would be impossible on the full data set.
The 22 covariates correspond to the top 10 covariates flagged in the BACE
study, along with 12 others chosen uniformly at random from the remaining
candidates.
Summaries of exact EB and FB analyses (with Zellner–Siow priors) can
be found in Table 3. Two results are worth noting. First, the EB inclusion
probabilities are nontrivially different from their FB counterparts, often dis-
agreeing by 10% or more.
Second, if these are used for model selection, quite different results would
emerge. For instance, if median-probability models were selected (i.e., one
includes only those variables with inclusion probability greater than 1/2),
the FB analysis would include the first four variables (and would almost
choose the fifth variable), while the EB analysis would select only the first
two variables (and almost the third). While we would not endorse simply
choosing a model here, note that doing so would result in fundamentally
different economic pictures for the FB and EB analysis.
7. Summary. This paper started out as an attempt to more fully un-
derstand when, and how, multiplicity correction automatically occurs in
Bayesian analysis, and to examine the importance of ensuring that such
multiplicity correction is included. That the correction can only happen
through the choice of appropriate prior probabilities of models seemed to
conflict with the intuition that multiplicity correction occurs through data-
based adaptation of the prior-inclusion probability p.
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The resolution to this conflict—that the multiplicity correction is indeed
pre-fixed in the prior probabilities, but the amount of correction employed
will depend on the data—led to another conflict: how can the empirical-
Bayes approach to variable selection be an accurate approximation to the
full Bayesian analysis? Indeed, we have seen in the paper that empirical-
Bayes variable selection can lead to results quite different than those from
the full Bayesian analysis. This difference was evidenced through examples
(both simple pedagogical examples and a more realistic practical example),
through simulation studies, and through information-based theoretical re-
sults. These studies, as well as the results about the tendency of empirical-
Bayes variable selection to choose extreme pˆ, all supported the general con-
clusions about empirical-Bayes variable selection that were mentioned in the
Introduction.
APPENDIX: VARIATIONS ON ZELLNER’S G-PRIOR
Conventional variable-selection priors rely upon the conjugate normal-
gamma family of distributions, which yields closed-form expression for the
Table 3
Exact inclusion probabilities for 22 variables in a linear model for GDP growth among
a group of 30 countries
Covariate Fully Bayes Emp. Bayes
East Asian dummy 0.983 0.983
Fraction of tropical area 0.727 0.653
Life expectancy in 1960 0.624 0.499
Population density coastal in 1960s 0.518 0.379
GDP in 1960 (log) 0.497 0.313
Outward orientation 0.417 0.318
Fraction GDP in mining 0.389 0.235
Land area 0.317 0.121
Higher education 1960 0.297 0.148
Investment price 0.226 0.130
Fraction confucian 0.216 0.145
Latin American dummy 0.189 0.108
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 0.188 0.117
Political rights 0.188 0.081
Primary schooling in 1960 0.167 0.093
Hydrocarbon deposits in 1993 0.165 0.093
Fraction spent in war 1960–1990 0.164 0.095
Defense spending share 0.156 0.085
Civil liberties 0.154 0.075
Average inflation 1960–1990 0.150 0.064
Real exchange rate distortions 0.146 0.071
Interior density 0.139 0.067
30 J. G. SCOTT AND J. O. BERGER
marginal likelihoods. To give an appropriate scale for the normal prior de-
scribing the regression coefficients, Zellner (1986) suggested a particular form
of this family:
(β | φ)∼N
(
β0,
g
φ
(X′X)−1
)
,
φ∼Ga
(
ν
2
,
νs
2
)
with prior mean β0, often chosen to be 0. The conventional choice g =
n gives a prior covariance matrix for the regression parameters equal to
the unit Fisher information matrix for the observed data X. This prior
can be interpreted as encapsulating the information arising from a single
observation under a hypothetical experiment with the same design as the
one to be analyzed.
Zellner’s g-prior was originally formulated for testing a precise null hy-
pothesis, H0 :β = β0, versus the alternative, HA :β ∈ Rp. But others have
adapted Zellner’s methodology to the more general problem of testing nested
regression models by placing a flat prior on the parameters shared by the two
models and using a g-prior only on the parameters not shared by the smaller
model. This seems to run afoul of the general injunction against improper
priors in model selection problems, but can nonetheless be formally justi-
fied by arguments appealing to othogonality and group invariance; see, for
example, Berger, Pericchi and Varshavsky (1998) and Eaton (1989). These
arguments apply to cases where all covariates have been centered to have a
mean of zero, which is assumed without loss of generality to be true.
A full variable-selection problem, of course, involves many nonnested com-
parisons. Yet Bayes factors can still be formally defined using the “encom-
passing model” approach of Zellner and Siow (1980), who operationally de-
fine all marginal likelihoods in terms of Bayes factors with respect to a base
model MB :
BF(M1 :M2) =
BF(M1 :MB)
BF(M2 :MB)
.(34)
Since the set of common parameters which are to receive improper priors
depends upon the choice of base model, different choices yield a different
ensemble of Bayes factors and imply different “operational” marginal likeli-
hoods. And while this choice of MB is free in principle, there are only two
such choices which yield a pair of nested models in all comparisons: the null
model and the full model.
In the null-based approach, each model is compared to the null model
consisting only of the intercept α. This parameter, along with the precision
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φ, is common to all models, leading to a prior specification that has become
the most familiar version of Zellner’s g-prior:
(α,φ | γ)∝ 1/φ,
(βγ | φ,γ)∼N
(
0,
g
φ
(X′
γ
Xγ)
−1
)
.
This gives a simple expression for the Bayes factor for evaluating a model
γ with k regression parameters (excluding the intercept):
BF(Mγ :M0) = (1 + g)
(n−kγ−1)/2[1 + (1−R2
γ
)g]−(n−1)/2,(35)
where R2
γ
∈ (0,1] is the usual coefficient of determination for model Mγ .
Adherents of the full-based approach, on the other hand, compare all
models to the full model, on the grounds that the full model is usually
much more scientifically reasonable than the null model and provides a more
sensible yardstick [Casella and Moreno (2002)]. This comparison can be done
by writing the full model as
MF :Y =X
∗
γθγ +X−γβ−γ,
with the design matrix partitioned in the obvious way. Then a g-prior is
specified for the parameters in the full model not shared by the smaller
model, which again has k regression parameters excluding the intercept:
(α,βγ , φ | γ)∝ 1/φ,
(β
−γ | φ,γ)∼N
(
0,
g
φ
(X′
−γX−γ)
−1
)
.
This does not lead to a coherent “within-model” prior specification for
the parameters of the full model, since their prior distribution depends upon
which submodel is considered. Nevertheless, marginal likelihoods can still be
consistently defined in the manner of (34). Conditional upon g, this yields
a Bayes factor in favor of the full model of
BF(MF :Mγ) = (1 + g)
(n−m−1)/2(1 + gW )−(n−k−1)/2,(36)
where W = (1−R2F )/(1−R2γ).
The existence of these simple expressions has made the use of g-priors
very popular. Yet g-priors yield display a disturbing type of behavior often
called the “information paradox.” This can be seen in (35): the Bayes factor
in favor ofMγ goes to the finite constant (1+g)
n−m−1 as R2
γ
→ 1 (which can
only happen if Mγ is true and the residual variance goes to 0). For typical
problems this will be an enormous number, but still quite a bit smaller than
infinity. Hence, the paradox: the Bayesian procedure under a g-prior places
an intrinsic limit upon the possible degree of convincingness to be found in
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the data, a limit which is confirmed neither by intuition nor by the behavior
of the classical test statistic.
Liang et al. (2008) detail several versions of information-consistent g-
like priors. One way is to estimate g by empirical-Bayes methods [George
and Foster (2000)]. A second, fully Bayesian, approach involves placing a
prior upon g that satisfies the condition
∫
∞
0 (1 + g)
n−kγ−1π(g)dg =∞ for
all kγ ≤ p, which is a generalization of the condition given in Jeffreys (1961)
(see Chapter 5.2, equations 10 and 14).
This second approach generalizes the recommendations of Zellner and
Siow (1980), who compare models by placing a flat prior upon common
parameters and a g-like Cauchy prior on nonshared parameters:
(βγ | φ)∼C
(
0,
n
φ
(X′γXγ)
−1
)
.(37)
These have come to be known as Zellner–Siow priors, and their use can
be shown to resolve the information paradox. Although they do not yield
closed-form expressions for marginal likelihoods, one can exploit the scale-
mixture-of-normals representation of the Cauchy distribution to leave one-
dimensional integrals over standard g-prior marginal likelihoods with respect
to an inverse-gamma prior, g ∼ IG(1/2,2/n). The Zellner–Siow null-based
Bayes factor under model Mγ then takes the form
BF(Mγ :M0) =
∫
∞
0
(1 + g)(n−kγ−1)/2[1 + (1−R2γ)g]−(n−1)/2
(38)
× g−3/2 exp(−n/(2g)) dg.
A similar formula exists for the full-based version:
BF(MF :Mγ) =
∫
∞
0
(1 + g)(n−m−1)/2[1 +Wg]−(n−k−1)/2
(39)
× g−3/2 exp(−n/(2g))dg
with W given above.
These quantities can be computed by one-dimensional numerical integra-
tion, but in high-dimensional model searches this will be a bottleneck. Luck-
ily there exists a closed-form approximation to these integrals first noted in
Liang et al. (2008). It entails computing the roots of a cubic equation, and
extensive numerical experiments show the approximation to be quite accu-
rate. These Bayes factors seem to offer an excellent compromise between
good theoretical behavior and computational tractability, thereby overcom-
ing the single biggest hurdle to the widespread practical use of Zellner–Siow
priors.
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